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Abstract I review George Levine’s provocative and
highly original book Darwin Loves You. Levine, whose
“home discipline” is English Literature, offers a com-
pelling interpretation of Darwin’s works, evaluating
their content and Darwin’s prose style to identify a
distinctly Darwinian attitude toward nature as a source
of meaning and value. Levine believes that Darwin
exemplifies the capacity to feel “enchantment” about
the natural world, suggesting that, if Darwin’s example
were followed, a “Darwinian re-enchantment of the
world” would be brought about. This would offer a
secular, non-supernatural basis for purpose, meaning,
and value. I conclude with a few critical remarks about
the scope and cogency of Levine’s proposal.
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Introduction
George Levine’s aim in Darwin Loves You is to argue
that Darwin’s own understanding of nature can and
should serve as a model for a non-supernatural, secular
conception of meaning and value. To understand this
aim, consider Augustine’s vivid account of “concupis-
cence of the eyes,” which serves as a dramatic counter-
point to the account of meaning and value Levine finds
in Darwin.
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To satisfy [a] morbid craving, monstrous sights
are exhibited at shows. From the same motive
efforts are made to scrutinize the secrets of the
natural world that lie beyond our sight; knowledge
of these is of no profit, yet people want to know
them simply for the sake of knowing. The same
motive prompts some to seek perverted knowl-
edge through magical practices.
. . .
[T]he many minute, contemptible things that so-
licit our curiosity each day are beyond counting
. . . . [W]hen I am sitting at home, why does a
lizard catching flies, or a spider binding them when
they blunder into its web, often have me gazing
intently? Does the fact that these animals are
so small make any difference to the situation?
True, I pass from watching them to praising you,
wonderful creator and dispenser of all that is, but
it is not in that frame of mind that I begin to watch.
(Augustine 2001, 213–14)
As will be seen, these passages reflect a view of the
significance of the observation of nature which is pre-
cisely at odds with what Levine believes to be Darwin’s.
Augustine finds the close study of nature, particularly in
its miniature aspects, to be morally abhorrent and only
partially redeemed by the access it provides to divinity;
Darwin (on Levine’s reading) finds the minute study of
nature to be best taken as an end itself and indeed, to
be the activity in which the value of life itself is most
clearly seen. Levine identifies Darwin as a man who,
charmed by what he found in nature—for instance,
in his study of barnacles—finds community with every
plant and animal, coming to love all living things, and
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coming to feel what his place in the universe is: Quite
literally, Levine suggests, Darwin loves you, just as he
loves every other living thing.
Darwin Loves You begins, in chapter one, with an
account of what Levine (p. 1), borrowing from Max
Weber, calls “the disenchantment of the world:” As
science progresses, providing rational explanations for
more and more of what was once regarded as mysteri-
ous and sacred, the world seems, as a result, to become
less appealing a place to live, more and more absent
of meaning. This problem sets up the central task of
the book, which is to elaborate a non-supernatural
account of life’s value. The rest of the book follows
a two-part plan. First, Levine works to establish the
motivation and theoretical foundation for the work
(chapters 2–4); second, he advances his novel readings
of Darwin (chapters 5–7), offering a Darwinian solution
to the problem of the disenchantment of the world.
This amounts to explaining the sense in which “Darwin
loves you” should be understood. This second part
of the book, in which Levine answers to his calling
as a scholar of literature—assessing texts in view of
their language and meaning—is by far the more inter-
esting, important, and better executed. Moreover, the
essential points of its content most likely to be of inter-
est to readers of Evolution: Education & Outreach are
independent of the work of the first part. Accordingly,
I will not provide any detailed or systematic account
of this first part of the book, but will rather proceed
immediately in the next section to Levine’s defense and
elaboration of “the Darwinian re-enchantment of the
world.”
Turning Mysteries into Problems
W. H. Mallock was, according to Levine (p. 2), one
of the “most brilliant and witty antagonists” of those
Victorians such as T. H. Huxley, John Tyndall, and
W. K. Clifford, who “exuberantly advertised the power
of science to transform the world” (p. 2). Levine
(pp. 2–3) cites Mallock’s melancholy observation that
an increase in scientific knowledge seems to have led
to a decrease in the satisfaction we are able to attain
in life.
In a number of ways, whilst we have not been
perceiving it, [life’s] objective grandeur has been
dwindling . . . . In the last few generations man has
been curiously changing. [He] has become a crea-
ture looking before and after; and his native hue
of resolution has been sicklied over by thought.
The early twentieth century sociologist Max
Weber, according to Levine (p. 23), best formulates
this sense of the dwindling objective grandeur
of life. The problem is that our society has been
“bureaucratically ‘rationalized’,” resulting in a culture
which is “impersonal, routine, and mechanized” and
which exists in order to sustain the “efficient and
rationally organized structures upon which modern
Western societies depend” (p. 23). The consequences of
this for our inner life are disastrous. “Disenchantment,
Weber insists, consistently affirms that without magic,
without God, without teleology, enchantment is purged
from the world and, with it, the world’s meaning and
the world’s value” (p. 23). On Levine’s account, Weber
believes that he has recognized a dilemma. Either
the world is a charmed place of mystery and wonder,
or else it is explained by science. Understanding
the world robs it of “transcendental spirit” and “the
transcendent,” “value,” and “the teleological;” and it
fails to evoke a “deeply emotional, visceral response”
to the circumstances of human existence (p. 24).
If Weber had been able to look ahead to the present
day, he would have found that the elimination of
mystery and transcendence is seen as an important
virtue of science by those such as the psychologist
Steven Pinker, who, as Levine (p. 2) notes, claims that
“our understanding of how the mind works has been
‘upgraded’ from a ‘mystery’ to a ‘problem’.” Levine
(pp. 2–3) identifies how he believes William James
might respond if he were to confront someone with
views such as Pinker’s.
“When we read . . . proclamations of the intel-
lect bent on showing the existential condition
of absolutely everything,” [James] asserts with
something like contempt, “we feel—quite apart
from our legitimate impatience at the somewhat
ridiculous swagger of the program . . . menaced
and negated in the springs of our innermost life.”
[James] talks of “cold-blooded assimilations” that
“threaten . . . to undo our soul’s vital secrets” and
of the “assumption that spiritual value is undone
if lowly origin be asserted.”
Darwin, of course, is the scientist with whom we most
associate the idea that we have “lowly origins.” Evo-
lutionary explanations and explanations that invoke
natural selection are often intended to show that the
characteristics we value as most essentially human—
our appreciation of art and beauty; our capacity for
love; intellect; a moral sense; religious experience and
feelings of awe—are the products of an unseemly “war
of all against all.” Evolutionary science is often taken to
be an exemplary instance of the dilemma formulated by
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Weber: Either the aspects of ourselves we most highly
value have evolved by natural selection and other evo-
lutionary processes and can be explained and made
rational; or else they remain inspiring, mysterious, and
wonderful. Levine seeks to show that this dichotomy is
a false one. By reading Darwin’s texts, by seeing how
Darwin himself approached the study of nature and
the wonder he felt about what he found, a third com-
pelling alternative can be articulated: the Darwinian
re-enchantment of the world.
Levine’s Darwin reached his understanding of mean-
ing and value by a hard road. Overcome by the vast
suffering and the innumerable lives of both human be-
ings and animals lost in the “struggle for existence,” he
violently rejected as repugnant the idea of providence,
that is, the idea that there is a divine plan for the moral
improvement of individuals and reward for those that
are good. I describe Levine’s account of Darwin’s crisis
in the section “The Unconsolable Darwin”. As it hap-
pens, Levine believes that, although Darwin was not
able to identify any way in which one could be consoled
or compensated for loss and pain, he found that he
could satisfy the need for wonder and a sense of belong-
ing in his investigation of nature and its explanation by
natural selection. This, the Darwinian re-enchantment
of the world, is my topic in the sections “What Is
Darwinian Enchantment?” and “Levine’s Argument”
found below.
The Unconsolable Darwin
The main line of thought in the second portion of the
book has as its starting point an account of some of
the origins of Darwin’s dissatisfaction with the notion
that there is a benevolent creator. At some point fairly
early on in his study of nature, beginning as early as
his Beagle voyage, Darwin found it more and more
difficult to accept the idea that pain and suffering can be
justified because they fit into some larger divine plan.
Levine’s reading imputes to Darwin a novel two-part
rejection of arguments for God’s existence. First,
Darwin finds it incomprehensible that a benevolent
deity would permit such suffering in the first place.
This is the response many have to pain and suffering,
which creates for them the “problem of evil.” Second,
Levine suggests that Darwin finds it incomprehensible
that a divine creator would have created beings whose
purpose in life is to suffer.
Putting together these two sources of dissatisfaction
with the divine represents an interesting twist on a
response often made to the argument from design.
Proponents of the argument from design claim that,
just as the existence of a complex, finely tuned machine
such as a watch or jet engine requires a designer, so do
organisms, which are just as complex and finely tuned.
The human eye and hand are paradigm examples of
“design” in nature. In response, some point out that
there are many examples of poor design in nature:
The human tailbone, tonsils and other vestigial organs,
and even fundamental defects in the design of the eye.
Darwin’s twist on this response to the argument from
design is to point out that it would be a particularly
significant defect in the divine design of human beings
if part of their very purpose in life were to suffer.
More than just tonsillitis or the pain of falling on one’s
tailbone, this “design problem” threatens to induce a
downwardly spiraling existential crisis in the human
population. The reasoning is that either (1) the argu-
ment from design is saved, with the premise that the
creator designed us to suffer as a part of some providen-
tial plan or (2) the argument from design is abandoned,
because it is clear that, if there were a creator, that
being made a colossal error—designing one’s creatures
to suffer is surely a defect in design. Darwin is drawn to
(2), abandoning the argument from design.
Extending the argument, Darwin notes that humans
are not the only creatures that suffer needlessly. The
animal kingdom, whose citizens outnumber the human
population by many orders of magnitude, is rife with
pain. Many more are born than can survive; death is
violently gruesome, the dead often stepped on, eaten,
or simply left to rot where they lay in their final
moments. Someone shocked at the amount of suffer-
ing that human beings experience would be stunned
into speechless horror at the thought that a divine
creator intended for this to happen, that is, for pain,
suffering, and needless death to occur on such a vast
scale as it does in the animal world. This could only
result from ill will, a heinous mockery of creatures
unfortunate enough to both have the capacity to suffer
and to be helpless against a superior power. Levine
(p. 162) presents an intriguing paragraph, deleted
from Darwin’s Autobiography by his family after his
death.
That there is much suffering in the world no one
disputes. Some have attempted to explain this in
reference to man by imagining that it serves for
his moral improvement. But the number of men
in the world is as nothing compared with that of
all other sentient beings, and these often suffer
greatly without any moral improvement. A being
so powerful and so full of knowledge as a God who
could create the universe, is to our finite minds
omnipotent and omniscient, and it revolts our
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understanding to suppose that his benevolence is
not unbounded, for what advantage can there be
in the suffering of millions of the low animals
throughout almost endless time?
Darwin’s thinking in this way seems to have begun
early in his career, on the Beagle. Levine’s (pp. 151–
2) view is that Darwin’s description of St. Paul’s rocks,
seen on the Beagle voyage, is a kind of “antipoetry,”
which indicates that Darwin was starting to recognize
the ugliness and cruelty of nature, rather than seeing it
as a backdrop to providence. Levine (p. 151) quotes the
following passage from Darwin concerning the origins
of life on the rocks.
[I observe] a fly (Olfersia) living on the booby, and
a tick which must have come here as a parasite
on the birds; a small brown moth, belonging to a
genus that feeds on feathers: a beetle (Quedieus)
and a woodlouse from beneath the dung; and
lastly numerous spiders, which I suppose prey
on these small attendants and scavengers on the
waterfowl.
Levine (pp. 150–1) further cites Darwin, who writes
in the Voyage of the Beagle that “feather and dirt-
feeding and parasitic insects and spiders [are] the first
inhabitants of a newly formed oceanic island,” a reality
which “destroys the poetry” of “the often repeated
description of the stately palm and other noble tropical
plants, then birds, and lastly man, taking possession of
the coral islands as soon as formed.” Rather than a
provident benevolence creating a peaceful and beauti-
ful sequence of events by which a remote island is pop-
ulated, ending with colonization by humans, Darwin
observes ugliness, the most disgusting and unpleasant
creatures arriving first.
What Is Darwinian Enchantment?
No longer able to take the idea of divine providence
seriously, Darwin turned his gaze toward nature itself
as a source of meaning. Rather than seek compensation
for suffering by means of a divine plan, Darwin ac-
cepts that no compensation can be had, instead seeking
community with those who suffer. This includes every
living thing. He identifies with plants, animals, and all
the other denizens of nature. Darwin personifies them,
and in turn, feels affinity with them, exchanging places
with them in his imagination, prepared to feel as he
imagines they do. For the naturalist, this generates
wonder, astonishment at what different ways of life are
possible, and creates an opening in one’s experience for
empathy with the suffering, pain, and loss of others.
This sense of wonder, amazement, and moral concern
derives not from one’s awareness of divine providence
or a redemptive, divine meaning. Rather, it derives
from the awareness that these other ways of life and the
excitements, sufferings, and other “experiences” of the
organisms one observes and identifies with are indeed
the products of natural processes, that the ordinary ebb
and flow of nature itself—by way of the usual day-
to-day processes with which we are all familiar—has
resulted in such complexity, in the web of relation-
ships and dependencies characteristic of even the most
simple ecosystems. A similar thought is expressed by
Emerson.
The greatest delight which the fields and woods
minister, is the suggestion of an occult relation
between man and vegetable. I am not alone and
unacknowledged. They nod to me, and I to them.
The waving of the boughs in the storm, is new
to me and old. It takes me be surprise, and yet
is not unknown. Its effect is like that of a higher
thought or a better emotion coming over me,
when I deemed I was thinking justly or doing
right. (Emerson 1849, 9–10)
To be clear, Levine’s proposal is not that Darwin
finds meaning in an alternative belief system, and in
particular, Levine is not suggesting that Darwin offers
an argument for such a position. My account above
of Darwin’s responses to arguments for the existence
of God and providence describes the kinds of “gut-
level” reactions attributed to Darwin by Levine, that
is, Darwin’s feelings and experience of pain and its role
in his sense that the world is not the product of divinity
and provides no access to it—and his sense of wonder
at nature. Moreover, the opportunity for enchantment
Levine believes Darwin to have noticed and articulated
is a particular kind of experience, a kind of moment or
turning point at which someone properly attuned can
experience wonder and enchantment. Furthermore, the
idea is that, just as Darwin had this experience, other
people—including us—can have it.
Levine elaborates concerning the nature of this
experience of enchantment, drawing on the work of
Jane Bennett (Bennett 2001). According to Bennett,
Levine (p. 35) notes approvingly, enchantment is “a
peculiar kind of mood . . . I pursue a life with moments
of enchantment . . . rather than an enchanted life.”
Levine (p. 35) explains that “it might be appropriate to
call the moods of enchantment ‘spots of time,’ moments
that, while they can be relatively rare in one’s life, fill
it with meaning and value, and evoke memories and
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connections that themselves, become richer and fuller.”
He continues, quoting from Bennett.
“To be enchanted is to be struck and shaken
by the extraordinary that lives amid the familiar
and the everyday . . . the mood I [Bennett] [am]
calling enchanted,” she says, “involves . . . a sur-
prising encounter,” that contains “the pleasurable
feeling of being disrupted or torn out of one’s
default sensory-psychic-intellectual disposition.”
Its effect is “a mood of fullness, plenitude, or
liveliness, a sense of having had one’s nerves or
circulation or concentration powers tuned up or
recharged—a shot in the arm, a fleeting return to
childlike excitement about life.”
Levine echoes Nietzsche’s remark, made in Beyond
Good and Evil (Nietzsche 2009, 62), that “A man’s
maturity [is] having rediscovered the seriousness that
he had as a child, at play.” Levine (p. 36), enlarging
on Bennett’s view, comments that “there we are, if
unapologetically, back to Weber’s ‘big children’.” This
refers to Weber’s question, “[w]ho—aside from cer-
tain big children who are indeed found in the natural
sciences—still believes that the findings of astronomy,
biology, physics, or chemistry could teach us anything
about the meaning of the world?” (p. 32).
In conclusion to this account of Levine’s under-
standing of Darwin’s enchantment by nature, consider
a useful parallel that Levine draws between Darwin
and the natural theologian, Paley. Paley, well known
for elaborating the argument from design, takes the
wonder of nature as evidence that God exists. On the
one hand, “Paley asks for wonder at the astonishing
working of God;” on the other hand, “Darwin, through
his metaphors, seeks to shift the wonder to the aston-
ishing work of nature” (pp. 235–6). As well, “Darwin’s
anger at the failures of the world that Paley saw as de-
signed by a beneficent Creator is manifest throughout
[Darwin’s work]: Would God, he said, ‘ordain that the
crop and tail-feathers of the pigeon should vary in order
that the fancier might make his grotesque and fantail
breeds?’ ” (p. 237).
Levine’s Argument
Having presented Levine’s account of Darwin’s solu-
tion to the problem of disenchantment identified by
Weber, I now present Levine’s argument that this in
fact is Darwin’s solution to that problem. The central
insights, Levine argues, are to be found in Darwin’s
prose style. On the one hand, someone might ignore
Darwin’s language, trying to isolate Darwin’s argu-
ments and claims, a practice Levine (p. 223) calls “skim-
ming” the argument “off the top” of its presentation
in Darwin’s texts. Levine believes that this is possible
and that it is probably necessary to do so in order to
understand Darwin’s biological theories. On the other
hand, one might attend carefully to the language in
which those arguments are formulated, in which case
one would learn a great deal about Darwin’s attitude
toward nature. “Skimming” alone misses an important
set of values Darwin holds and fundamental conclu-
sions he reaches about how to live.
Encapsulating his interpretation of Darwin, Levine
(p. 244ff) identifies a pattern in Darwin’s writing that
Levine sees as the central evidence that Darwin does
indeed communicate the experience of enchantment to
his readers. The pattern is as follows: First, Darwin ex-
presses wonder and amazement about the phenomena
he is observing, say, a part of a barnacle or the behavior
of aphids or worms. This is marked in the text by excla-
mations to the effect that it seems highly unreasonable
to believe that the phenomenon in question came about
by natural means because it is so extraordinarily com-
plex, beautiful, or because it is otherwise remarkable or
strange. Second, as if to respond to his own amazement,
Darwin provides just such a naturalistic explanation
of the phenomenon in question. In doing so, Levine
claims, Darwin does not dispel the sense of wonder
that he feels, continuing to express surprise, delight,
and astonishment. This is precisely contrary to Weber’s
expectation that explaining a phenomenon renders it
insignificant, inert for the purposes of evaluating one’s
place in the universe or contributing to one’s sense of
oneself.
According to Levine, passages providing evidence of
Darwin’s enchantedness have two important aspects,
in addition to generally proceeding according to the
general strategy described above. First, Darwin often
records his enchantment in passages in which fine de-
tails of some trait that is minutely small are being
communicated. He offers the following example of this
kind of passage (pp. 217–18).
As I am summing up the singularity of the phe-
nomena here presented, I will allude to the mar-
velous assemblage being seen by me within the
sac of an Ibla quadrivalvis,—namely, an old and
young male, both minute, worm-like[,] destitute of
a capitulum, with a great mouth, and rudimentary
thorax and limbs, attached to each other and to
the hermaphrodite, which latter is utterly different
in appearance and structure; secondly, the four
or five, free boat-shaped larvae, with the curious
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prehensile antennae, two great compound eyes,
no mouth, and six natatory legs . . . .
Both the general strategy I describe above and the
focus on the details of a small-scale object are exempli-
fied in this passage. Darwin starts by remarking that the
objects of his study are “singular” and “marvelous;” the
detailed description follows, the excitement generated
by his observations remaining unabated. The passage
(not quoted in full above) ends with the exclamation
that although these various forms have “scarcely any-
thing in common . . . [they] all [belong] to the same
species!” This is not a sober conclusion or consideration
concerning the taxonomic or physiological implications
of the observations such as someone whose sense of
wonder had been destroyed might provide.
This is Darwin’s answer to Augustine, who chastises
himself for observing nature, claiming that such obser-
vation is itself a kind of sin as well as being a kind of
idleness. The remedy for such sins is to attempt to wrest
one’s focus from nature, turning it to God. Levine’s
Darwin finds the observation of nature a source of
value and meaning in itself: The closer the observation
of nature, the richer and greater in magnitude is the
sense of wonder one feels.
The second important aspect of passages in which
Darwin records the experience of enchantment, ac-
cording to Levine, is that they often personify (“an-
thropomorphize”) the creatures and plants described
in them. Darwin personifies the organisms he observes,
describing them as though they were making decisions
based on human motives and feelings. By doing so,
Levine argues, Darwin identifies with his objects of
study, thinking what he or someone like him would do
if his place as observer were traded with his objects’
places and he were among them. This establishes the
identification with the organisms that is essential to
Darwin’s re-enchantment. One response to the amaz-
ing and wondrous complexity of nature might be to
attribute those qualities to divinity. Instead, Darwin
imagines his own world and way of life as continuous
with those he observes, finding himself a part of nature.
As evidence of this pattern of explanation, Levine
(p. 195) cites a passage from The Descent of Man con-
cerning female choice the selection of mating partners.
With respect to female birds feeling a preference
for particular males, we must bear in mind that we
can judge of choice being exerted, only by placing
ourselves in imagination in the same position. If
an inhabitant of another planet were to behold
a number of young rustics at a fair, courting and
quarreling over a pretty girl, like birds at one of
their places of assemblage, he would be able to
infer that she had the power of choice only by
observing the eagerness of the wooers to be please
her, and to display their finery.
Levine (pp. 195–6) proposes that this strategy of
personification is particularly well-suited for expressing
enchantment because the imagined exchange of places
is mutual.
The world is so thick with feeling and value as
Darwin enters into the ‘mind’ of the female birds.
It is hardly that dead, arid place that Weber tells us
is the consequence of scientific explanation. Much
of the Descent depends on placing ourselves imag-
inatively in the condition of some other being.
. . .
[I]n slipping into his thought experiment and cre-
ating a hypothetical encounter between a pretty
country girl and competing male suitors, Darwin
actually introduces [female choice] into human
mating . . . .
Darwin’s proposal that females choose mates is
important, Levine argues, because there was a near-
consensus in the late nineteenth century that women
did not possess the initiative or discernment necessary
to identify and pursue potential partners. Darwin’s
thought experiment provided a means for him to imag-
ine new possibilities for human behavior, as well as
explain that of animals. Close observation is a strategy
of becoming more attached to the world, of being able
to understand one’s needs and desires and to identify
new kinds of meaning and value.
Critical Questions
I find Levine’s argument convincing. I believe that
Darwin did experience something like the wonder and
enchantment Levine describes and that this is clearly
indicated by the evidence Levine provides. As well, I
believe that many other people, particularly scientists,
feel a similar enchantment and sense of wonder, in just
the same kinds of circumstances Darwin did. Nonethe-
less, there are two issues that I would like to raise in
criticism of Levine’s conclusion.
The first issue I would like to raise is, to whom
might the Darwinian secular re-enchantment appeal?
Consider two groups of people. (1) Those that are at
present satisfied with the meaning and purpose of their
lives, because they have religious faith or some other
set of beliefs that provides them with a basis for the
necessary feeling of enchantment about the world. (2)
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Those that at present are not satisfied with the meaning
and purpose of their lives, having either abandoned or
never having had any set of beliefs that provided the
basis for the necessary feeling of enchantment about
the world.
Next, consider whether members of either of these
two groups would be likely to find the Darwinian
re-enchantment of the world a compelling prospect.
Clearly, members of group (1), those that already
have some basis for feeling wonder about the world
and their place in it, would not find the Darwinian
re-enchantment compelling: There is no need they
presently have that the re-enchantment satisfies. At
some later time, should they lose their capacity for won-
der, perhaps in a crisis of faith, they might begin to find
the Darwinian re-enchantment attractive. Otherwise,
the re-enchantment is not what William James (James
1911, 2) would call a “live option” for these people.
For people in group (2), the Darwinian attitude toward
nature may in fact be a “live option.” Already having
moved away from a supernatural (or other) source of
wonder, those in this group might be moved to pursue
the Darwinian re-enchantment.
Is there any kind of argument that might be used
to convince those in group (1) to move away from
their presently held beliefs, toward nature as the source
of their enchantment? Similarly, is there any kind of
argument that might draw in the uncommitted in group
(2)? A central appeal of taking a Darwinian view of
nature as the source of one’s feelings of wonder is that
the view is reasonable to believe, given the evidence
we presently possess. If one is committed to the truth
and to believing within the limits of reason, one must
acknowledge that our relatives include many creatures
we find repugnant, that we were never guaranteed any
particular place in nature and that, now that we have
obtained one, there is no assurance that we will keep
it. The virtue of looking to a Darwinian view of nature
as a source of wonder is something like Freud’s sugges-
tion that, whatever the difficulties of living within the
bounds of our rationality, we must attempt, at least, do
so: “[Human beings] cannot remain children for ever;
they must in the end go out into ‘hostile reality.’ We
may call this ‘education to reality’ ” (Freud 1989, 717).
Nonetheless, as Levine (p. 257) points out, “there is
no way to argue that my feeling is somehow better than
your feeling.” Many people are comfortable allowing
that the problem of evil probably does have some solu-
tion, even if it might not be clear what it is; that science
has its domain of explanatory power, and religious
traditions and spirituality have another; and many peo-
ple are comfortable living with contradiction and the
unexplained. Levine admits that, at best, it ought to be
acknowledged by everyone that “the commitment to a
Darwinian and secular interpretation of such phenom-
ena as the march of the penguins [or any other complex,
adaptive behavior] is entirely compatible with those
feelings of wonder and awe that have traditionally been
expressed by religion, and that commitment entails
the fullest possible respect and sympathy for the
natural phenomena and the living beings around us”
(pp. 257–8). Being able to argue that the Darwinian
account of our origins and place in the universe is
compatible with the experience of enchantment is not
a particularly ambitious aim. What would be better
would be to have an argument that everyone ought
to adopt such a secular view, not just that everyone
acknowledge that the view is not incoherent.
On the strength of the line of thought elabo-
rated above, I see the appeal of the Darwinian re-
enchantment to be limited, even at its maximum
extent. If one is already lacking the sense that the world
is perfect and has come to accept that there are no
consolations to be had for suffering and loss, perhaps
moments of Darwinian enchantment supply a sufficient
quantity of wonder for a satisfying life. For those not in
this position, there is simply no reason to feel the kind
of enchantment Darwin felt. For those with sufficient
faith, scientific explanation does not destroy wonder,
which they believe to be supernatural. Levine’s book
can serve, at best, as an appeal to those already inclined
to look to nature but not beyond as a source of value.
This in itself is an important achievement, but it might
have been hoped that Levine would be able to offer a
general solution to the problem of finding meaning and
value in life.
The second issue I would like to raise is whether the
Darwinian re-enchantment can, in fact, provide enough
for someone to live a fulfilling and meaningful life.
This question can be extended to enchantment more
generally: Is a sense of wonder all that one needs in
order to feel complete and to understand one’s place
in the universe? I think that it is clear that it is not. The
sense of awe and wonder generated by the Darwinian
re-enchantment will not satisfy the central need that
belief in a non-natural source of meaning has been
called upon since Plato to provide a sense of stability
and continuity in a natural world of constant change.
Augustine (2001, 66-7) voices this clearly.
[W]heresoever a human soul turns, it can but
cling to what brings sorrow unless it turns to [the
Divine], cling though it may to beautiful things
outside you [the Divine] and outside itself. . . .
They all rise and sink; in their rising they begin to
exist and grow toward their perfection, but once
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perfect, they grow old and perish; or, if not all
reach old age, yet certainly all perish . . . .
Let my soul use these [transient] things to praise
you,
O God, creator of them all,
but let it not be glued fast to them by sensual love,
for [my soul] too longs to be, and loves to rest in
what it loves
But in them it finds no place to rest,
because they do not stand firm;
they are transient, and who can follow them with
the senses of the body?
According to Levine, “material meaning is after all
‘meaning,’ and there is no reason (except more than
two thousand years of Western history, I suppose!) to
decide that meaning is only meaning when it transcends
the material conditions from which it emerges” (p. 263).
The appeal to a transcendent reality over “two thou-
sand years of Western history” is not due to intellectual
or spiritual inertia or prejudice—it provides the needed
counterweight to the world of flux and discontinuity
that is so characteristic of virtually all experience.
The natural line of response to this criticism of Dar-
winian re-enchantment is that, while it may be satis-
fying to believe that there is something not sensed or
experienced directly that sustains the world through
change, it is not at all clear that we are in a position
to affirm the existence of this kind of thing. Science, the
central tool we now have for explaining nature, gener-
ates knowledge based on experience, and its primary
results apply most directly to experience. It may be
difficult to face the world and at the same time deny
the transcendent, but at least we will be doing so with
our intellectual integrity intact, focused on improving
our condition by our own efforts.
Of what use to [us] is the mirage of wide acres
on the moon, whose harvest no one has yet ever
seen? As honest smallholders on this earth, [we]
will know how to cultivate [our] plot in such a
way that supports [us]. By withdrawing . . . expec-
tations from the other world and concentrating all
[our] liberated energies into . . . life on earth, [we]
will probably succeed in achieving a state of things
in which life will become tolerable for everyone
and civilization no longer oppressive to anyone.
(Freud 1989, 717)
Concluding Remarks
George Levine offers a compelling view of the kind of
deep attachment Darwin felt to his objects of study,
broadening that view to a general account of one kind
of meaning that one might find in one’s own life.
Levine’s interpretations of both content and form of
Darwin’s prose are eminently convincing. Levine faces
fundamental issues raised by Darwin’s conception of
natural selection and evolution, taking on the Socratic
question, “How should one live?” in the context of
evolutionary science. I hope that others are able to
respond likewise, extending and exploring the novel
and exciting proposals advanced in Darwin Loves You.
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